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The Icon and the Tracts:1  
A Restrained Renaissance of Religious Liberty  
in Ukraine 
[O]ne of the most vile things existing in the world, religion, [is ad-
vanced by] the attempt to replace the official state priests by priests of 
moral conviction. — V.I. Lenin2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A block from city hall in the Ukrainian metropolis of Lviv stands 
a domed cathedral. After the Soviets occupied Lviv during the Sec-
ond World War, they converted this church into a museum depicting 
the evils of religion throughout history, a type of museum common 
in the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1992, in addition to the older, di-
lapidated displays on the Spanish Inquisition and wars of the Refor-
mation, a visitor could observe a second kind of exhibit: brand-new 
displays of reverently adorned icons and Jehovah’s Witnesses’ tracts. 
The museum director, Volodimir Hayuk, whose institution had un-
dergone a complete ideological about-face in the previous months, 
had taken the absurdity in stride. His business card had read “Mu-
seum of History of Religion and Atheism,” but now the adaptable 
Mr. Hayuk was simply crossing out those last two words by hand.3 
He had done his part for perestroika. A new chapter in Ukraine’s his-
tory of religious liberty had opened. 
But will this new chapter last? This Comment suggests it will. By 
surveying Ukraine’s religious history, current churches, and modern 
ideological debate, and by analyzing its recent legislation on religious 
freedom in the context of Ukraine’s three most controversial church- 
 
 
 1. This title alludes to JAMES H. BILLINGTON, THE ICON AND THE AX: AN 
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN CULTURE (1970), which includes an analysis of Russia’s 
religious history. In this Comment, the “icon” refers to the rebirth of Ukraine’s traditional 
churches and the “tracts” to Ukraine’s new religious movements. 
 2. V.I. LENIN, Leo Tolstoy as a Mirror of the Russian Revolution, in RELIGION 37–38 
(1933). 
 3. This account reflects the experience of the author in Lviv, Ukraine, in 1992, as a 
volunteer for an international humanitarian aid organization. 
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state issues, this Comment concludes that Ukraine’s prospects for re-
ligious liberty evoke guarded optimism. 
State policy regarding religious liberty and legal rights has been 
extraordinarily important in Ukraine’s history. “Ukraine” means 
“boundary land,” and its religious dynamism stems from its location 
at the boundaries of religious tectonic plates. It straddles two fault 
lines: between Orthodoxy and Catholicism (the Great Schism oc-
curred in 1054), and between Christianity and Islam.4 Since A.D. 
988, when the kingdom of Kievan-Rus officially accepted Christian-
ity, church and religion have consistently played a central role for the 
people of Ukraine. No other institution has provided a measure of 
stability in Ukraine, a nation so dominated by foreign empires that it 
lacks “a politically usable past.”5  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s declaration of 
independence in 1991 partially dismantled the Soviet police state and 
yielded an environment of relatively free speech, press, and religious 
exercise. By every measure, this liberalization catalyzed an unprece-
dented religious renaissance. Qualitatively, the new range and variety 
of religious activities and organizations reflects a profound shift: 
from religion as the servant of “a state-controlled society to a plural-
ist and secular religious and social model.”6 Quantitatively, the num-
ber of registered congregations grew geometrically in the early 1990s 
and continues to increase.7 
Carried forward upon this wave of religiosity, the renaissance 
unleashed competition both among churches and between church 
and state. Such disputes were inconceivable in a state with one party 
and one church, which used brutal force and subtle infiltration to 
 
 4. See Bohdan Bociurkiw, Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek 
Catholics, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 131 
(Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995). See generally Anna Reid, BORDERLAND: A JOURNEY 
THROUGH THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE (1997). 
 5. Ilya Prizel, Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and “Soft” Authoritarianism, in 
DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, 
AND MOLDOVA 330, 331 (Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrott eds., 1997). 
 6. Vasyl Markus, Politics and Religion in Ukraine: In Search of a New Pluralistic Di-
mension, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA, supra 
note 4, 163, 163. 
 7. See id. at 173. In the late 1980s, 3500 congregations distributed among a dozen 
churches were registered. By 1994, 15,000 congregations representing 67 churches were regis-
tered. See id. By 1999, the total number of registered religious organizations exceeded 20,000. 
See Raisa Stetsyura, Over 1,400 Religious Groups Registered in Ukraine in 1998, ITAR-TASS, 
Feb. 8, 1999. 
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liquidate threats to either. By contrast, the new freedom and accom-
panying multiplicity of religious organizations makes open disagree-
ments possible, even inevitable. While the West accepts similar dis-
putes at home as normal consequences of pluralism and basic 
freedoms, Ukraine has inherited a different baseline of normalcy, and 
this discord troubles many Ukrainians. The three central disputes in 
this area regard the property rights of churches, the legal status of 
churches, and governmental policy toward (foreign) missionary or-
ganizations. By 1993, the honeymoon of euphoric openness toward 
religion ended, and Ukraine’s policy turned somewhat restrictive.8 
However, Ukraine has rejected both a campaign to establish a state 
church and an attempt to mimic Russia’s recent menacing measures.9 
Ukraine concludes its first decade of independence with significant 
religious freedom and pluralism intact. 
This Comment examines the status of religious freedom in 
Ukraine by surveying history, law, churches, and current ideological 
conflicts. It analyzes specifically three primary legal disputes (reli-
gious property, legal registrations, and missionary visas) and con-
cludes that Ukraine’s prospects for religious liberty evoke guarded 
optimism. Part II briefly reviews the history of the Ukrainian state as 
it relates to religion. The current patchwork of Ukraine’s churches is 
described in Part III. The Constitutional and legislative provisions 
that protect and regulate religious exercise in modern Ukraine are 
analyzed in Part IV. Part V identifies the competing ideologies in 
modern Ukraine’s government and society—totalitarianism, nation-
alism, and pluralism—that frame the conflicts between church and 
state. Part VI analyzes how the topics of the three previous Parts— 
churches, laws, ideologies—interact currently with three critical legal 
issues in Ukraine: property, legal registration, and foreign missionary 
visas. Lastly, Part VII concludes that Ukraine’s progress toward an 
intermediate degree of religious liberty and pluralism will likely be 
slow but enduring. 
 
 8. For a discussion of the 1993 Amendments, see infra Part IV.B. 
 9. See discussion infra Parts V.B.2, V.C. 
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II. HISTORY OF CHURCH AND STATE IN UKRAINE 
A. Early Statehood and State Religion 
The religious nature of Ukraine’s creation story presaged the 
special importance that religion would have in the nation’s history. 
In A.D. 988, Prince Volodimir the Great adopted Orthodox Christi-
anity for himself and his kingdom (present-day central Ukraine).10 
After a dramatic procession from the bluffs of his capital, Kiev, down 
to the riverbank below, Volodimir and his subjects were baptized en 
masse, by force if necessary.11 Impressed with the beauty of its liturgy 
and cathedrals (and wary of the doctrinal demands of Judaism and 
Islam), Volodimir chose Orthodoxy to consolidate his kingdom and 
form an alliance with Orthodoxy’s capital, Constantinople.12 
Initially, Christianity met strong resistance from pagan believers, 
who worshipped a pantheon of nature gods.13 Kiev’s imported Chris-
tian missionaries and monks sought refuge from native persecution 
in the caves of Kiev’s bluffs. Mongol invaders sacked Kiev14 in 1240 
and, in turn, eventually yielded to the expanding Lithuanian em-
pire.15 Both these conquerors of Ukrainian lands were content to tax 
their vassals, leaving undisturbed Ukraine’s culture and Orthodoxy.16 
Meanwhile, the center of Slavic religious and political life gravi-
tated north to Moscow.17 In the second half of the last millennium, 
three waves of Protestant missionaries rippled across decidedly Or-
thodox Ukraine.18 The first undulations occurred as an extension of 
the Protestant Reformation; the second followed the influx of Ger-
man settlers to the steppes of southern Ukraine, invited by the 
Czar’s Manifesto of 1763; and the third accompanied the (often 
temporary) migrations to the West at the turn of the century.19 
 
 10. See OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 33 (1988). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 33–34. 
 13. See id. at 33, 49. 
 14. See id. at 39–41. 
 15. See id. at 69–70. 
 16. See id. at 72. 
 17. See DAVID LITTLE, UKRAINE: A LEGACY OF INTOLERANCE 7 (1991). 
 18. See P. Yarotsky, A History of Missionary Activity in Ukrainian Lands 4–12 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (translation by the author of this Comment). 
 19. See id. 
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B. Church-State Relations in Prior Periods of Independence 
Aside from recent years, Ukraine’s “golden age” of political in-
dependence occurred in the seventeenth century. It too contained a 
powerful religious component. In 1596, the Orthodox bishops of 
western Ukraine, under Polish influence, formed a politically oppor-
tunistic alliance with Rome.20 This Union of Brest created a hybrid 
“Uniate” church21 that united Orthodox doctrine and ritual with an 
allegiance to the pope. Ukrainian Cossacks rebelled against the for-
eign (mostly Polish Catholic) nobles who had seized Ukrainian lands 
and held its inhabitants in serfdom.22 The Cossack brotherhood cre-
ated a nucleus of sovereignty (the Seech) in central Ukraine that 
eventually expanded to liberate much of modern Ukraine from for-
eign control by the 1650s.23 
A desire to restore Orthodoxy’s hegemony largely motivated this 
expansion.24 The Cossacks perceived themselves as “defenders” of 
the faith.25 The enmity toward exploitative foreigners combined with 
fervent religious intolerance to form a crusade on three fronts: the 
Catholic Poles in the west, the Islamic Turks and Tartars in the 
south, and the Jewish middle class within.26 But Russia to the north 
was Orthodox. The Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnitsky, having re-
stored Orthodoxy to a liberated Ukraine, formed a controversial (but 
probably necessary) alliance with Moscow, its brother in the faith.27 
Ukraine’s independence eroded as Russian imperialism reasserted it-
self, first with patronage and then invasion by Peter the Great.28 
This East-West religious and political divide split Ukraine into 
two spheres of influence until World War II. The Russian Empire 
and Russian Orthodox Church dominated central and eastern 
Ukraine, with a “symphonic” cooperation between church and 
state.29 Catholic control of western Ukraine alternated between Po-
 
 20. See SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 99–101. 
 21. The Uniate Church is also known as the Ukrainian Catholic Church or the Greek 
Catholic Church. 
 22. See SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 108–15. 
 23. See id. at 127–29. 
 24. See id. at 119–22, 129. 
 25. See LITTLE, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
 26. See SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 127–29. 
 27. See id. at 134–37. 
 28. See id. at 164–65. 
 29. See LITTLE, supra note 17, at 17. 
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land and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.30 During the disruption of 
World War I and the Russian Revolution, these two halves of 
Ukraine declared independence and eked out a few years of joint 
autonomy before the Red Army invaded.31 During this short inter-
lude of independence, the Ukrainian government viewed the church 
as a tool of state policy and established briefly an autonomous Or-
thodox Church in Ukraine.32 
C. Soviet Atheism and Post-Soviet Liberalization 
The era of official Soviet atheism devastated religion. In the first 
phase, Lenin’s begrudging, calculated toleration of the church33 
yielded to Stalin’s savage Terror.34 The second phase began when a 
besieged Soviet government enlisted the Orthodox Church to rally 
the faithful against the Nazi invaders.35 Though permitted to survive 
as the Soviet Union’s official church after the war, the Russian Or-
thodox Church, in Ukraine as elsewhere, was manipulated and infil-
trated by the state. Ironically, it was Stalin, perpetrator of the vast ar-
tificial famine intended to break Ukraine’s aspirations for 
autonomy,36 who unified present-day Ukraine into a single territorial 
entity. With the addition of traditionally Islamic Crimea in 1954, he 
ensured that Ukraine’s boundaries encompassed multiple latent but 
fervent religious allegiances.37 
The Gorbachev era of reform intended to reverse economic de-
cay but also gave voice to popular pressure for religious liberty.38 In 
1989, in a fitting image of Soviet totalitarianism’s demise and popu-
lar revenge for Stalin’s massive church demolition program a half-
century earlier, ordinary citizens with hammers pounded to pieces 
the Berlin Wall and the symbols of Communism’s atheist iconogra-
 
 30. See Markus, supra note 6, at 163; SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 313–16, 440–41. 
 31. See SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 350–79. 
 32. See Serhiy Plokhy, Church, State, and Nation in Ukraine 3–7 (Myroslav Yurkevich 
trans.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 33. See SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 400–02. 
 34. See id. at 417–21. 
 35. See Plokhy, supra note 32, at 8. 
 36. See SUBTELNY, supra note 10, at 413–16. 
 37. See id. at 499–500. 
 38. See Howard L. Biddulph, Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: Nationalism 
Versus Equal Protection, 1995 BYU L. REV. 321, 325–26. 
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phy.39 The following year, the Soviet legislature adopted a remarka-
bly liberal law on freedom of conscience and religion.40 In early 
1991, anticipating independence, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice 
began drafting a wave of seventy laws to undo Communism.41 The 
very first pair of these laws enacted by Parliament included the law 
that liberalized the right of religious exercise and organization.42 Par-
liament declared independence in August, and a national referendum 
overwhelmingly ratified that decision in December 1991.43 In terms 
of religious freedom, the new statutory framework afforded Ukraini-
ans the space to spread their wings, and the favorable winds of inde-
pendence sent the renaissance aloft. 
III. CHURCHES IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE 
Dominated by Orthodox Christianity for a millennium, “Ukraine 
is now a nation of many religions.”44 The patchwork quilt of reli-
gious allegiance in Ukraine’s territory today divides into three cate-
gories according to a matrix of dominance and longevity: (1) the 
traditional (i.e., pre-Soviet) and dominant churches are the three Or-
thodox churches and the Uniate45 church; (2) churches that are tra-
ditional but not dominant: Roman Catholics, Jews, Moslems, Bap-
tists, Lutherans, and Jehovah’s Witnesses;46 and (3) a potpourri of 
churches that are neither dominant nor traditional in Ukraine, 
known as new or minority religious movements (“MRMs”). These 
include the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Chris-
tian evangelical groups, Seventh-Day Adventists, and the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.47 
 
 39. See Serge Schmemann, Clamor in the East: Reunion in West Berlin; For All, East and 
West, a Day Like No Other, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1989, at 18. 
 40. See Biddulph, supra note 38, at 327–28. 
 41. See GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 203 (1996). 
 42. See id. The other law of the pair regarded the rehabilitation of victims of political 
repression. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 43. See id. at 203. 
 44. Markus, supra note 6, at 163. 
 45. As previously noted, the Uniate Church is also referred to as the Ukrainian Catholic 
Church or the Greek Catholic Church. 
 46. Jehovah’s Witnesses could also be characterized as MRMs because of the organiza-
tion’s relatively recent origin, strong missionary program, and well-organized congregational 
system. Unlike churches in the MRM category, however, Jehovah’s Witnesses had established a 
strong presence long before the U.S.S.R.’s collapse. 
 47. See infra Appendix (containing the official statistics of the State Committee on Reli-
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These churches operate against a backdrop of religiosity that may 
seem surprising for a formerly “atheist” state, though much of the 
religiosity is passive. At least half of the population professes religious 
belief, but 42% of these believers do not affiliate with a church.48 
Similarly, 33% actively support religion as a positive social force, but 
20% support it only passively, and 27% are indifferent.49 The church 
enjoys a greater degree of popular trust than any other institution, 
far above the political system.50 This section will qualitatively de-
scribe these principal religious organizations and the phenomena of 
MRMs in Ukraine. The Appendix contains the 1999 official statisti-
cal report by Ukraine’s State Committee of Religious Affairs.51 
A. Dominant Churches 
In accord with the history chronicled above, Orthodox 
Christianity remains the cultural backdrop for religious life in 
Ukraine, particularly in central and eastern Ukraine. But the golden 
luster of its onion-domed prominence has dulled. Soviet purges 
decapitated Orthodoxy, and Soviet infiltration discredited the 
remainder. Even Ukrainian independence has not rescued 
Orthodoxy from political manipulation. 
Today, three separate Orthodox Churches have evolved from an 
intricate dance of schisms and alliances in this century. First, in 1991, 
the Russian Orthodox Church (“ROC”) in Ukraine was given partial 
autonomy and a new name: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the 
Moscow Patriarchate (“UOC-MP”).52 It boasts the largest member-
 
gious Affairs). 
 48. Andrew Sorokowski, Religious Life, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Aug. 25, 1996, at 14 
(quoting results of a study by the Kyiv Center of Political Research and Conflict Studies). 
 49. See id. (quoting results of a 1996 study by the Scientific Center of Political Psychol-
ogy of the Ukrainian Pedagogical Academy). 
 50. See Borys Gudziak, Ukrainian Religious Life During the First Five Years of Inde-
pendence, in TOWARDS A NEW UKRAINE I: UKRAINE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 1991–
1996, 49, 53 (Theofil Kis et al. eds., 1997). 
 51. The official statistics on church size are all at the institutional level; i.e., they reflect 
the number of registered congregations rather than the number of adherents. Thus, they pro-
vide only a rough coloring of the religious map. They fail to account for the ferment of grass-
roots religious activity that operates below the radar screen of state regulation. No official sta-
tistics are available at the level of individual belief. Not even the number of church members 
can be accurately extrapolated from registration data because legal registration is optional and 
registered congregations vary widely in size, from a mere ten to hundreds of members. 
 52. See Andrii Krawchuk, Religious Life in Ukraine: Continuity and Change, 33:1 J. OF 
ECUMENICAL STUD. 59 (Winter 1996). 
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ship of the three and is even larger than ROC membership in Rus-
sia.53 As the ROC’s legal successor in Ukraine, it commands the 
most property and political clout. Second, the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (“UOC-KP”) is the orphan of a 
failed attempt by the Ukrainian government in the early 1990s to 
create a nationalist state church.54 Third, the Ukrainian Autocephal-
ous Orthodox Church (“UAOC”), formed in 1921 in opposition to 
the imperialist ROC, was stripped of its property and forced abroad 
in 1930.55 Since its reorganization in Ukraine in 1990, the UAOC 
has reestablished itself primarily in western Ukraine.56 
While the Orthodox churches are strongest in central and eastern 
Ukraine, the Uniate Church commands the allegiance of western 
Ukraine.57 In 1946, the Uniate Church was forcibly dissolved and all 
Uniate clergy, parishioners, and church buildings were “converted” 
by decree into the ROC.58 But many Uniate clergy and believers re-
sisted. They went underground as the “catacomb”59 Uniate Church 
and survived the Soviet period as the largest underground religious 
organization in the world.60 Since declaring its resurrection from the 
catacombs in 1987 and its legalization in 1989,61 the Uniate church 
has rebounded vigorously. But it has fallen short of restoring the 
“ethnoreligious monolith” that had existed in western Ukraine be-
fore the Soviet period.62 
B. Traditional, Non-Dominant Churches 
In the pre-Soviet era, religious influences from Ukraine’s 
neighbors trickled across the border, and a vibrant Jewish commu-
nity resided within. Despite its domination by the Orthodox and 
Uniate churches, Ukraine nevertheless enjoyed the beginnings of a 
religious marketplace in certain (mostly urban) pockets. 
 
 53. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 132, 144. 
 54. See id. at 143–50; see also discussion infra Part V.B. 
 55. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 134. 
 56. See id. at 140. 
 57. See Markus, supra note 6, at 165. 
 58. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 135. 
 59. Krawchuk, supra note 52, at 61. 
 60. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 136. 
 61. See Serhii Plokhy, Between Moscow and Rome: Struggle for the Greek-Catholic Patri-
archate in Ukraine, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Feb. 6, 1994, at 9. 
 62. Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 139. 
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Roman Catholicism has made recent inroads in the western 
oblasts63 bordering Poland.64 It has also extended a token presence 
across Ukraine that unnerves the Uniate Church, which sees itself as 
Rome’s adequate representative in Ukraine.65 Baptists and Luther-
ans, who were invited by the czarist government to bolster the in-
dustrial labor force and cultivate the fertile steppe, came to Ukraine 
as missionaries and settlers and maintained a lasting presence.66 Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses operated for decades at the grassroots level beneath 
the government’s radar and can now do so openly.67 
Aside from Christian faiths, Judaism boasts a strong heritage. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, one-third of the world’s Jews lived in 
Ukrainian lands, the birthplace of Hasidism.68 However, emigration 
and the Holocaust decimated Jewish communities. Though eco-
nomic hardship has replaced religious persecution as the impetus for 
emigration, up to 500,000 Jews remain in Ukraine, the fifth largest 
population in the world.69 In recent years, a religious revival enjoyed 
by urban Jewish communities has caused many to stay.70  
Islam, which has its historic roots in the Crimean peninsula, also 
has experienced a renaissance.71 Since its independence, the Ukrain-
ian government has welcomed Crimean Tartars back to their ances-
tral homeland. Scattered throughout the U.S.S.R. by forced migra-
tions, many are returning to Crimea, swelling the ranks of Muslim 
communities.72  
Perhaps the most remarkable display of religious endurance is the 
revival of pre-Christian paganism that worships the gods of ancient 
Kievan-Rus. The largest such religious organization is the Native  
 
 
 63. An oblast is an administrative district comparable to a province. Ukraine’s territory is 
divided into 25 such oblasts. 
 64. See Markus, supra note 6, at 168. 
 65. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 152; Andrew Sorokowski, Inter-Church Relations, 
and Society, Address Before the 1997 Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Conference on 
Ukraine Since Independence, 23 (1997) (unpublished address, on file with author). 
 66. See Yarotsky, supra note 18, at 7–11. 
 67. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 152; Yarotsky, supra note 18, at 13. 
 68. See Markus, supra note 6, at 172. 
 69. See James Rupert, Ukrainian Jews Glory in Religion’s Revival: With Decades of Re-
pression Ended, Synagogues and Schools Flourish, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1995, at A1. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Markus, supra note 6, at 172. 
 72. See id. 
17SMI-FIN.DOC 5/5/01  3:59 PM 
815] Religious Liberty in Ukraine 
 825 
Ukrainian National Faith (“RUNVira”), led by intellectuals and art-
ists who oppose the “invading Christian Church.”73 
C. Minority Religious Movements 
After the Bolshevik Revolution, the small currents of religious 
pluralism were frozen by Soviet rule. Religious channels from abroad 
were dammed and religious practice at home severely chilled. But the 
collapse of Communism opened the floodgates. Religious ideas, in-
formation, and missionaries poured in, not only from Ukraine’s im-
mediate neighbors as before, but from every continent. Minority re-
ligious movements blossomed, creating an unprecedented 
environment of religious diversity in Ukraine.74 Spiritual conversion, 
curiosity, material assistance, exposure to foreigners, and a hope of 
connections or travel to the West combined to generate immense 
initial interest in MRMs. 
The research of Professor Lyudmila Filipovich provides a general-
ized description of typical MRMs in Ukraine.75 Geographically, 
MRMs have emerged primarily where Soviet atheist policy weakened 
traditional religiosity most effectively: in urban areas of the central, 
eastern, and southern regions.76 Unlike traditional churches, MRMs 
nurture their membership in smaller, well-accounted-for congrega-
tions (usually up to about 100 individuals).77 Members of MRMs are 
disproportionately young, female, well-educated, socially established, 
Russian-speaking, and without prior religious affiliations; ethnicity 
seems irrelevant.78 
Though scarcely a decade old, MRMs in Ukraine have matured 
in their relationship with society. Initially, MRMs in Ukraine “were 
not so much a religious protest as they were an ideological and 
worldview protest against the theory and practice of Communism. 
Only in time did they metamorphosize from movements ‘against’ to 
 
 73. Yanina Sokolovskaya, New Pagans Against the Christian Church, in IZVESTIA, Oct. 
31, 1997, at 8, reprinted in 49:44 CURRENT DIG. OF POST-SOVIET PRESS 20 (1997). 
 74. See Markus, supra note 6, at 173. 
 75. See Lyudmila Filipovich, Tendencies of Change and Growth of New Religious 
Movements in Ukraine, 7–15 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (transla-
tion by the author of this Comment). 
 76. See Markus, supra note 6, at 173–77; Filipovich, supra note 75, at 6. 
 77. See Filipovich, supra note 75, at 8. 
 78. See id. at 7–15. 
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movements ‘for.’”79 With a foothold secured, MRMs “are now inter-
ested in their inclusion into the mainstream” through “[c]harity 
work, education, publication and dissemination of religious litera-
ture, propagation of the truths of their teachings in the mass media, 
state recognition and registration, and a desire to establish relations 
with traditional churches.”80 Statistically small, but rapidly growing, 
the MRM phenomenon has brought new and vibrant colors to the 
religious landscape. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The constitutional and statutory provisions regarding religious 
exercise and institutions offer broad protections for these liberties. 
Their tenor is promising. They ensure a clear textual basis for claims 
of basic religious liberty. But their implementation is subject to three 
countervailing historical habits. First, like its citizens, Soviet law lived 
a double life. Publicly declared legal protections lacked any practical 
effect. Even the Soviet Constitution, for example, had “guaranteed” 
religious liberty.81 Second, citizens lack the leverage to press their le-
gal rights against the state. The rarity of redress and the threat of of-
ficial retribution discourage most would-be petitioners from the at-
tempt. Third, these statutory provisions are young and this 
Constitution even younger.82 Behind them lurks an old totalitarian 
 
 79. See id. at 10–11. 
 80. Id. at 11. 
 81. U.S.S.R. CONST. of 1977, art. 52 (“Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed free-
dom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct 
religious worship or aetheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility on religious grounds is pro-
hibited. In the U.S.S.R., the church is separated from the state, and the school from the 
church.”). 
The Soviet Constitution also nominally guaranteed other rights central to religious lib-
erty: freedoms of speech, press, assembly, processions, demonstrations, and association in pub-
lic organizations. See id. arts. 50–51 (“Article 50. In accordance with the interests of the peo-
ple and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and 
demonstrations. Exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by putting public buildings, 
streets and squares at the disposal of the working people and their organisations, by broad dis-
semination of information, and by the opportunity to use the press, television, and radio. Arti-
cle 51. In accordance with the aims of building communism, citizens of the USSR have the 
right to associate in public organisations that promote their political activity and initiative and 
satisfaction of their various interests. Public organisations are guaranteed conditions for suc-
cessfully performing the functions defined in their rules.”). 
 82. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations was adopted in 
1991, and the Ukrainian Constitution in 1996. 
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impulse to which officials may default when public laws seem cum-
bersome. 
A. 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations 
The principal statutory framework for regulating religious exer-
cise is the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organiza-
tions (“Law on FCRO”).83 It was adopted in April 1991, several 
months before Ukraine’s independence, and was afterwards reaf-
firmed as legally effective. Conscious of its break with Soviet history, 
the statute lists among its purposes “overcoming the negative conse-
quences of the government’s policy in relation to religion and the 
church.”84 It proposes also to bring religious rights into harmony 
with “norms of international law.”85 The statute’s last article explic-
itly states that if this legislation conflicts with an international treaty 
which Ukraine has signed, then the treaty trumps Ukrainian law.86 
1. Individual and corporate rights 
The provisions of the Law on FCRO, which are considered gen-
erous by Ukraine’s historical standards, describe a set of individual 
rights. Article 3 gives every citizen a right to freedom of conscience 
“includ[ing] the freedom to profess, accept, and change one’s relig-
ion or convictions by individual choice.”87 Parents can rear their 
children “in accordance with their personal convictions and attitude 
toward religion.”88 No one can require clergy to reveal information 
confessed to them by believers.89 
Other provisions regulate churches and religious organizations. 
Churches and religious organizations are separate from the state and 
 
 83. Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, Vidomosti Verkhov-
noyi Rady (BBP) 1991, No. 25, at 283 (enacted Apr. 23, 1991, as Statute No. 988-12) [here-
inafter Law on FCRO]. 
 84. Id. art. 1 (translated from the Ukrainian text by the author of this Comment). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. art. 32. Ukraine has ratified the major international agreements regarding 
religious liberty, including the United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief, as well as the CSCE’s Vienna Concluding Document. See 
Biddulph, supra note 38, at 322 n.4. 
 87. Law on FCRO, supra note 83, art. 3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
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state schools; they cannot participate in political parties; and they 
cannot “interfere in the activities of other religious organizations or, 
in any form, preach enmity, intolerance toward non-believers and be-
lievers of other faiths.”90 But religious organizations may participate 
in public life, with media access equal to that of other civic organiza-
tions, and may create their own schools.91 Religious educators are 
required to teach “in the spirit of tolerance and respect for citizens 
not professing any religion and for believers of other faiths.”92 
2. Property, legal registration, and missionary visas 
The statute contains provisions pertinent to the three salient is-
sues discussed later in this paper: property, legal registration, and 
foreign missionaries. As for property, religious organizations may 
own various forms of portable property and may lease by contract 
(but not own) buildings and land.93 The statute permits rotational 
use of the same facility by multiple religious organizations, but for-
bids “unauthorized seizure” of church buildings or accouterments.94 
It empowers oblast governments to settle disputes between religious 
organizations over religious property and real estate.95 
To achieve legal status, a religious organization must register 
with the state by submitting a charter and a petition to the state for 
approval. The charter must detail the following: the type of religious 
organization, its religious affiliation, location, and its status in that 
church’s hierarchy; the property held by the religious organization; 
the religious organization’s right to establish enterprises, schools, 
media, and other religious organizations; and the mechanism for dis-
posing of property in the event of dissolution.96 This petition for reg-
istration must be signed by at least ten members of the religious or-
ganization, who are citizens of Ukraine and at least eighteen years of 
age.97 The oblast government reviews the registration documents and 
must answer in writing within one month, or three months in “nec-
essary cases” which require the opinion of the oblast leadership or 
 
 90. Id. art. 5. 
 91. See id. arts. 5, 6. 
 92. Id. art. 6. 
 93. See id. art. 17. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. art. 12. 
 97. See id. art. 14. The members must also provide their name, address, and signature. 
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specialists.98 The government may refuse to register a religious or-
ganization “if its charter or activity contradicts current laws,” and 
this decision can be appealed in court.99 A court may terminate the 
religious organization’s operations and activities if the religious or-
ganization violates this statute or other legislation.100 
The 1991 version of article 24 threw open the legal doors to the 
outside world. It permitted religious organizations to establish direct 
contacts abroad, send representatives abroad for training and confer-
ences, import religious information and literature, and receive for-
eign citizens into religious educational institutions.101 It imposed no 
mobility restrictions specific to religion beyond Ukraine’s general 
visa and border-related legislation.102 However, the relatively permis-
sive features of the statute were partially curtailed in a set of amend-
ments adopted only two years later. 
B. 1993 Amendments to the Law on FCRO 
A set of nine restrictive amendments enacted in December 1993 
reigned in the liberality of the 1991 Law on FCRO.103 These 
amendments strengthened the state’s hand in dealing with religious 
organizations, particularly in the three salient legal issues of property, 
legal registrations, and missionary visas. The amendments confer a 
significant degree of discretion upon local governments, whose ad-
ministrative decisions are usually the first and last word, for example, 
on whether a church can construct a facility or invite a missionary.104 
Such broad downward delegation, by which national governments 
avoid direct responsibility for decisions that could constitute human 
rights violations, can fatally frustrate enforcement of international 
covenants. 
First, in property matters, the state accorded itself a more direct 
role in mediating disputes among religious organizations concerning 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. art. 15. 
 100. See id. art. 16 (1991 unamended version). 
 101. See id. art. 24 (1991 unamended version). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady (BBP) 1993, No. 26, at 277 (enacted Dec. 23, 
1993, as Statute No. 3795-12) [hereinafter 1993 Amendments]. For a thorough analysis of 
the 1993 Amendments, see Biddulph, supra note 38, at 335–43. 
 104. See 1993 Amendments, supra note 103, arts. 16, 17, 24 (as amended in 1993). 
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religious property.105 Second, an amendment to article 16 affected 
the legal status of religious organizations. It expanded the grounds 
on which the government can terminate a religious organization’s 
activities to include “ritual or preaching by the religious organization 
that encroaches upon the life, health, liberty, or dignity of the per-
son” and “systematic violations . . . of legislation regarding the proc-
ess for conducting public religious events (services, rites, ceremonies, 
etc.).”106 Third, the most abrupt and far-reaching changes regarded a 
religious organization’s foreign connections. Amendments to article 
24 place potentially severe restrictions on the mobility of foreign 
missionaries. All “foreign citizens temporarily residing in Ukraine,” 
whatever their religious function or activities, may perform these du-
ties “only in those religious organizations which invited them, and 
by the official permission of the government office which approved 
the registration of that religious organization’s charter.”107 
The potential severity of this change becomes more apparent in 
its procedural context: foreign religious personnel cannot obtain a 
visa into Ukraine until they receive an invitation from a legally regis-
tered religious organization that has been approved by the corre-
sponding government office. Even if successfully obtained, these vi-
sas are often short-term and thus require frequent renewal by 
approval of that same government office. Because a religious organi-
zation is registered at the level of the oblast government, or even city 
government, that government office may interpret the invitation to 
be territorially limited to its own small jurisdiction. Even if the na-
tional government interprets article 24 liberally, the practical auton-
omy at the oblast level yields restrictive interpretations. In short, the 
local government office can collar any foreign missionary with a short 
leash throughout his or her stay. 
C. 1996 Constitution of Ukraine 
The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted on June 28, 1996, con-
tains both general and specific provisions that apparently protect re-
ligious freedom. Chapter I (“General Principles”) asserts generally 
that “[t]he State is answerable to the individual for its activity,” and 
its “main duty” is to “affirm and ensure human rights and free-
 
 105. See id. art. 17 (as amended in 1993). 
 106. See id. art. 16 (as amended in 1993). 
 107. Id. art. 24 (as amended in 1993). 
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doms.”108 “Appeals to the court in defence of the constitutional 
rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen” provide judicial 
redress.109 Juxtaposed with these individual rights are assertions of 
state interests: to promote “the consolidation and development of 
the Ukrainian nation, of its historical consciousness, traditions and 
culture, and also the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minori-
ties of Ukraine.”110 
In Chapter II (“Human and Citizens’ Rights, Freedoms and Du-
ties”), article 24 assures equal protection for “citizens” by forbidding 
“privileges or restrictions based on race, colour of skin, political, reli-
gious and other beliefs, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, 
place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics.”111 Article 26 
gives “[f]oreigners and stateless persons who are in Ukraine on legal 
grounds . . . the same rights and freedoms[,] and [these persons] 
also bear the same duties as citizens of Ukraine, with the exceptions 
established by the Constitution, laws or international treaties of 
Ukraine.”112 Article 33 enumerates “guaranteed freedom of move-
ment”113 as one of those rights, and article 36 adds “the right to 
freedom of association in political parties and public organisations for 
the exercise and protection of their rights and freedoms.”114 
Besides these general guarantees, the provision that relates di-
rectly to religious liberty is article 35. It states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of personal philosophy and 
religion. This right includes the freedom to profess or not to 
profess any religion, to perform alone or collectively and without 
constraint religious rites and ceremonial rituals, and to conduct 
religious activity. 
The exercise of this right may be restricted by law only in the inter-
ests of protecting public order, the health and morality of the 
population, or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. 
 
 108. UKR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 1, art. 3. 
 109. Id. ch. 1, art. 8. 
 110. Id. ch. 1, art. 11. 
 111. Id. ch. 2, art. 24. 
 112. Id. ch. 2, art. 26. 
 113. Id. ch. 2, art. 33. 
 114. Id. ch. 2, art. 36. 
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The Church and religious organisations in Ukraine are separated 
from the State, and the school—from the Church. No religion shall 
be recognised by the State as mandatory. 
No one shall be relieved of his or her duties before the State or re-
fuse to perform the laws for reasons of religious beliefs. In the 
event that the performance of military duty is contrary to the reli-
gious beliefs of a citizen, the performance of this duty shall be re-
placed by alternative (non-military) service.115 
The practical interplay between these constitutional provisions and 
ordinary legislation is yet unsettled. Though the Constitution asserts 
its supremacy as the “highest legal force” and requires that other le-
gal acts “shall conform to it,”116 future interpretation and legislation 
will shape the specific contours of its applicability. Basic questions 
about this young Constitution remain unanswered. What restrictions 
on legal registration of churches violate the freedom of association? 
What is the scope of the “claw back” exceptions that permit the State 
to restrict religious exercise?117 When do restrictions on the internal 
movement of foreign missionaries violate freedom of movement? 
Will Ukraine’s international treaty obligations meaningfully shape 
the contours of these constitutional rights? 
V. THE COMPETING IDEOLOGIES 
An analysis of Ukraine’s textual commitments to religious liberty 
and its history of church-state relations cannot ignore the competing 
ideologies whose interaction has shaped public policy toward reli-
gious rights in Ukraine. Totalitarianism, nationalism, and pluralism, 
each espoused by disparate factions in the government and in soci-
ety, reveal the divergent understanding of Ukraine’s character and 
destiny. The weathervane that pivots in this ideological storm indi-
cates the future of religious liberty in Ukraine. The winds of evidence 
point toward gradual pluralism, despite formidable opposition. 
 
 115. Id. ch. 2, art. 35. 
 116. Id. ch. 1, art. 8. 
 117. For a discussion of these “claw back” provisions that trump individual rights, see 
Richard Rezie, The Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens’ Rights Provisions, 31 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 169 (1999) (concluding that the Constitution encodes broad but 
unenforceable “social goals” as “positive Constitutional rights,” which seriously dilutes the 
enforceability of specific limits on government action). 
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A. Totalitarianism 
A decade of post-Communist change has revealed that, despite 
reforms, totalitarianism runs deep in Ukraine. As recently as the 
1998 Parliamentary elections, “recurrences of the totalitarian con-
science continue” to trigger relapses into the State’s “entrenched 
habits . . . to use the Church for its own political interests.”118 This 
resiliency has multiple sources and few direct counterweights. 
1. Sources of resilient totalitarianism 
The impulse toward totalitarianism is partially motivated by the 
perception that Ukraine’s “political pluralism,” “lack of consensus,” 
and “[i]nternal discord . . . contributed to uninterrupted domination 
by foreign countries.”119 This “disappointment in Ukraine’s democ-
ratic experiment [after World War I] and a feeling of betrayal by the 
West” led to “the birth of integral nationalism and totalitarian-
ism.”120 This “association of democracy with chaos and the demise of 
earlier Ukrainian states” weighs in favor of order and against lib-
erty.121 As in politics, crises in economics correlate with totalitarian 
measures against religious liberty. In 1993, economic difficulty 
turned to disaster in Ukraine;122 by year’s end, the Parliament en-
acted the restrictive amendments to the Law on FCRO. Similarly, 
Russia’s infamous 1997 law restricting religion123 coincided with a 
year of economic collapse.124 
Ukraine’s reformers express frustration that, unlike Russia in 
1990, Ukraine experienced no coup or subsequent cleansing. In 
Russia, the hard-line leaders of the failed coup against Gorbachev 
were forced to capitulate to the ascendant Yeltsin, allowing him to 
clean house and push through a flurry of reforms. By contrast, the 
 
 118. Lyudmila Filipovich, Church-State Relations in Ukraine, 5 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH & 
ST. RES. 173, 179 (1998). 
 119. Prizel, supra note 5, at 334. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 335. 
 122. See Lee Hockstader, Ukraine: A Breadbasket Becomes a Basket Case, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 8, 1993, at A1; Ukraine Over the Brink, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1993, at 45. 
 123. For an excellent analysis of the 1997 Russian law, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lau-
ren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An 
Analytical Appraisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101 (1998). See also Daniel Williams, Faith-
Curbing Bill Becomes Law in Russia, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1997, at A16. 
 124. See Martin Wolf, Russia’s Missed Chance, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at 24. 
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Ukrainian nomenklatura125 embraced national independence pre-
cisely to escape these reformist pressures from Moscow and thus re-
tain their grip.126 No natural opportunity to purge the government 
of its reactionary elements arose, so old political cadres remained 
largely intact.127 And what are those cadres like? One scholar has 
characterized the vetting of Ukrainian government officials as “anti-
Darwinist self-selection, according to which the worst and the dim-
mest were most inclined to join the party or state apparatus.”128 
Totalitarian heavy-handedness is an attitude not confined to the 
state. These same perverse incentives generated the cadres of the Or-
thodox Church, as bishops were chosen “on the basis of their servil-
ity to Moscow and their ‘iron-hand’ control over the priests.”129 Or-
thodox leaders exhort the government to be more authoritarian 
against others. They advocate state-engineered Orthodox exclusivity 
over Ukraine, restrictions on other churches, and hostility to foreign 
missionaries.130 To many Orthodox, this reflex to discriminate and 
prohibit poses no contradiction to reform. Instead, it seems a justi-
fied response to a bitter irony. Despite intense and prolonged perse-
cution by the mighty Soviet state, Orthodoxy did survive. Compro-
mised and corrupted, it still preserved the flickering flame of faith. 
Now liberated in an era of reform, it fears the renewal of its influence 
threatened by its inability to keep pace with more vibrant churches 
and foreign missionaries.131 
2. Weakness of legal institutions to counterbalance totalitarianism 
To create an institutional culture that meaningfully protects reli-
gious liberty, Ukraine must transcend its totalitarian history. The 
rule of law, civil society, and citizen empowerment are essential to 
this process. In Ukraine, these institutions are still in their infancy. 
 
 125. Nomenklatura is the term used to describe the ruling elite of the Soviet system. 
 126. See Prizel, supra note 5, at 343. 
 127. See generally id. 
 128. ALEXANDER MOTYL, DILEMMAS OF INDEPENDENCE: UKRAINE AFTER TOTALITAR-
IANISM 163 (1993). 
 129. Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 153. 
 130. See id.; Biddulph, supra note 38, at 337. 
 131. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: UKRAINE (Sept. 5, 2000) 
(visited May 4, 2001) <http//www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_ 
ukraine.html> [hereinafter 2000 STATE DEP’T REPORT]; Not Spreading the Faith, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2000, at 35. 
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Yet they are gradually gaining the strength to challenge totalitarian-
ism. 
For all its liberalization, post-Soviet democracy is not yet a sys-
tem in which individuals assert their rights and push back the infring-
ing state. Under Soviet rule, private rights of action and citizen-suits 
against the government were unknown. Government action “result-
ing in coercion or repression was, for practical purposes, usually 
without legal recourse.”132 The law was not used by citizens to “re-
solve their disputes, assert their interests, or . . . place limits on gov-
ernmental power.”133 Judges, who did not enjoy lifetime appoint-
ments, were chosen and promoted for their political reliability and 
their grasp of “telephone justice.”134 
Today, while the press and elected legislatures guard against the 
state’s worst abuses, courts are not yet defenders of individual lib-
erty. The “separation of powers doctrine, the rule of law, constitu-
tionalism, and an independent judiciary” have no roots in Ukraine 
because they were “incompatible with Soviet communist ideology 
and practice.”135 The law was merely an instrument in the hands of 
the ruling elite to advance a political agenda. Even when official state 
policy toward religion is neutral, the vast state bureaucracy inherited 
from the Soviet era poses serious obstacles. Inert, cautious, and indif-
ferent, its modus operandi is passive obstructionism.136 The system 
rewards bureaucrats for their ability to sidestep outright confronta-
tion and avoid blatant outrage. These incentives can raise procedural 
costs to levels that frustrate the most determined citizen initiatives. 
Religion has the potential to reorder post-Communist society. As 
Lenin and Stalin well understood, religion and its institutions di-
rectly threaten the state’s omnipresence and near omnipotence. 
Notes one modern church-state luminary, “Religions are in effect 
independent centers of power, with bona fide claims on the alle-
giance of their members, claims that . . . will sometimes trump the 
claims to obedience that the state makes.”137 When religion’s differ-
 
 132. Kim Ratushny, Toward the “Independence . . . of Judges” in Ukraine?, 62 SASK. L. 
REV. 567, 580 (1999). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 581. Also known as “telephone law,” this term referred to the manner in 
which political bosses controlled decisions rendered by judges. Id. 
 135. Id. at 577. 
 136. See Prizel, supra note 5, at 338. 
 137. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 35 (1993). 
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ent voice “moves the faithful to action, a religion may act as a coun-
terweight to the authority of the state.”138 
De Tocqueville observed the following contrast: in America, re-
ligions “helped to fill the vast space between the people and the gov-
ernment . . . that the government might otherwise fill by itself”; but 
in other countries, “people relied upon the state to solve all prob-
lems, and concomitantly lost their liberty.”139 Soviet society fit this 
description precisely. The state was the only public actor. De Toc-
queville warned of the danger to democracy “if ever a government 
wholly usurped the place of private associations.”140 The Soviet state 
achieved exactly that. The success of Ukraine’s nascent democracy 
depends upon its ability to foster an intermediate layer of civil soci-
ety, generated in part by religious organizations, to mediate between 
citizens and state. As the most trusted institutions in Ukraine today, 
churches can play a critical role in engaging individuals in voluntary 
public life and reversing the pervasive malaise of personal ineffi-
cacy.141 Indeed, it seems unlikely that any other institution can do 
so.142 
However, even Ukraine’s dominant churches have yet to become 
an independent force in public life today.143 They remain largely si-
lent on the rights of women, the death penalty, arms trade, and envi-
ronment.144 The public discourse on pornography, family issues, 
abortion, and drug and alcohol abuse lacks the moral voice and 
guidance that churches could articulate. This disengagement of the 
dominant churches from the moral issues of society has concerned 




 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 36 (characterizing de Tocqueville’s observation). 
 140. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969). 
 141. See Prizel, supra note 5, at 360. 
 142. Politics seems incapable of the task. In 1993, despite the heady new freedoms of 
speech and the press, 86% of the population belonged to no voluntary organization. See Prizel, 
supra note 5, at 358. Compared to its (also post-Communist) Eastern European neighbors, 
Ukraine has far fewer voluntary associations, and most of these have a religious nature. See 
Bohdan Krawchenko, Building State and Civil Society in Ukraine, in TOWARDS A NEW 
UKRAINE I: UKRAINE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 1991–1996, supra note 50, at 9, 16. 
 143. See Prizel, supra note 5, at 349–50. 
 144. See Sorokowski, supra note 65, at 23. 
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political rehabilitation of the church as a civic institution which suf-
fered from the totalitarian regime.”145 
B. Nationalism 
1. Religion and nationalism inextricably intertwined 
Nationalism is a strong force in Ukrainian public life, even 
though Ukraine has been independent, or even intact, for only a few 
short intervals. Nationalism and religious fervor have long been “in-
extricably intertwined,” particularly in the western regions.146 The 
two concepts so overlap in the Ukrainian mind that the public still 
has difficulty dissociating a church’s religious legitimacy from its civil 
legitimacy.147 
The proposition that “the religions live by resisting” may explain 
the persistent vibrancy of religion (and its link with nationalism) in 
Ukraine.148 For centuries, its traditional churches have been forms of 
resistance and “nation-building agents.”149 The Cossack rebellion, 
the Soviet-era Uniate underground, and the popular mass demon-
strations of the 1980s all mingled the goals of religious and national-
ist expression.150 The Soviet criminalization of the Uniate Church in 
1946 and its legalization in 1989 coincided with the suppression and 
resurgence, respectively, of the nationalist movement.151 In this dec-
ade, the revived Uniate Church and the Orthodox Church in 
Ukraine have sought to wrest autonomy from Rome and Moscow.152 
Domestically, the alliance between Ukraine’s “pro-independence 
postcommunist leadership and the formerly obedient, pro-regime 
 
 145. Ukrainian President Speaks for Moral Rehabilitation of Church, UNIAN News 
Agency, June 11, 1999, (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Kiev Unit). 
 146. Samuel W. Lewis, Foreword to UKRAINE: A LEGACY OF INTOLERANCE, supra note 
17, at x. 
 147. See LITTLE, supra note 17, at 69. 
 148. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 84 
(1987). According to Tracy, “religions, at their best, always bear extraordinary powers of resis-
tance. When not domesticated as sacred canopies for the status quo nor wasted by their own 
self-contradictory grasps at power, the religions live by resisting.” Id. at 84–85. 
 149. Markus, supra note 6, at 164. 
 150. See discussion supra Part II. 
 151. See Serhiy Plokhy, Between Moscow and Rome: Struggle for the Greek-Catholic Patri-
archate in Ukraine, 37:4 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 849, 851 (1995). 
 152. See id. 
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church elite”153 secured the 90.3 percent vote in favor of independ-
ence in the 1991 national referendum.154 
2. Effect of nationalism on religious liberty 
Nationalism has exerted various pressures on religion in the last 
decade. To the extent that early nationalist fervor in the Baltics and 
Ukraine pressured Gorbachev to liberalize state policy toward relig-
ion, nationalism expanded religious liberty.155 Today, nationalists 
support even non-traditional churches if they preach, educate, and 
publish religious texts in Ukrainian, because the nationalists consider 
them useful allies in Ukraine’s cultural revival.156 
But most nationalist pressures today, like those of Ukraine’s prior 
periods of national independence, tend to restrict religious liberty. 
Ukraine’s dominant churches invoke nationalism to defend their tra-
ditional religious territory against all foreign churches.157 They op-
pose pluralistic accommodation and insist on exclusive privileges.158 
Nationalists oppose the UOC-MP and many MRMs on the grounds 
that they typically use the Russian language in church services and 
literature, even though Russian is the preferred language for a major-
ity of urban Ukrainians. Nationalism pits the Orthodox Churches 
against each other; the UOC-KP rejects the UOC-MP as the edge of 
the wedge of Russian imperialism. 
However, perhaps the most comforting news about religious lib-
erty in Ukraine is what has not occurred. Religious freedom has not 
been subordinated to nationalism. After a decade of darkening de-
velopments for MRMs in Russia, the Ukrainian government has not 
been persuaded by similar nationalistic arguments to adopt xeno-
phobic religious policy. It has not returned to the policy of co-opting 
a dominant church into a political tool. Instead, it seems to view 
MRMs “favorably,” because these groups “do not question the le-
gitimacy of the state and accept the principle of church-state separa-
tion, which is a cornerstone of Ukrainian religious policy.”159 
 
 153. Markus, supra note 6, at 166; see SMITH, supra note 41. 
 154. See Markus, supra note 6, at 166; SMITH, supra note 41. 
 155. See Bociurkiw, supra note 4, at 136. 
 156. See Filipovich, supra note 75, at 20. 
 157. See 2000 STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 131, at sec. I (“Government Policies on 
Freedom of Religion”). 
 158. See id. 
 159. Markus, supra note 6, at 172. 
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Though the 1993 Amendments indicated a “nationalist retreat from 
full religious liberty,”160 the retreat has since proved only partial. 
This threat of nationalism seems to be receding, as the two 
churches with the strongest nationalistic element (the UOC-KP and 
the UAOC) struggle even to maintain legitimacy.161 In the early 
1990s, by establishing an independent Orthodox Church (UOC-
KP) to complement the newly independent state, President 
Kravchuck had hoped to enlist religion in the political cause of na-
tion-building. But the scheme collapsed.162 It was the closest that 
modern Ukraine came to establishing a state church and it backfired 
completely. Ideologically, the UAOC seemed susceptible to co-
option as the state’s tool in the nation-building effort and thus se-
cure preferential status.163 It espouses independence from the ROC; 
a “Ukrainianization” of the traditions, art, music, language, and rites 
used in services; and the self-governing, participatory practices at-
tributed to the primitive Christian communities.164 Yet for all its na-
tionalist appeal, the UAOC remains the weakest native church, 
stripped of its registration.165 Unlike his predecessor, President Ku-
chma has kept the state at a distance from any would-be “state” 
church.166 This neutrality comports with the “prevailing legal and 
political mood [that] appears to favor continued toleration” and a 
gradual withdrawal from church affairs.167 
C. Pluralism 
Pluralism affords the best hope for—and the best evidence of—
religious liberty in Ukraine. Though totalitarianism and nationalism 
have dominated Ukraine’s ideology in the twentieth century, plural-
ism also has deep roots and promising recent growth. 
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1. Historical roots of pluralism 
Ironically, Ukraine’s sad history of (mostly exogenous) religious 
repression affords reasonable hope for pluralism. Ukraine “presents a 
ringing endorsement of the cause of religious pluralism” in the sense 
that “[t]he seventy-year campaign of religious discrimination and 
persecution perpetrated by the Soviet government was, by all ac-
counts, a complete failure.”168 The devotion to pluralism among 
Ukraine’s progressive political forces is “born of long and bitter ex-
perience with the effects of politicized religion.”169 Ukraine has long 
enjoyed religious pluralism to a much greater degree than monolithi-
cally Orthodox Russia, thanks to its heterogeneous and influential 
neighbors and to its diversified demographics, which is due in part to 
“forcible transfers of various nationalities.”170 
Favorable attitudes toward pluralism emerged in Ukraine’s last 
period of independence (1918–1921), and “the commitment to po-
litical, social, and economic equality, along with tolerance for mi-
norities, has endured as a key element of Ukrainian concepts of de-
mocracy.”171 As independence neared again in 1991, it was “widely 
and passionately affirmed throughout Ukraine that only a genuine 
system of religious pluralism . . . has a chance of overcoming the leg-
acy of intolerance and the tradition of violence bequeathed for so 
long to the Ukrainian people.”172 Today, nationwide polls consis-
tently reflect the population’s “remarkable commitment to tolerance 
and freedom.”173 In one poll, eighty-seven percent viewed religious 
liberty as important.174 
The liberality of the 1991 Law on FCRO reflected the rush of 
liberalization in those years. The resultant “psychological depressuri-
zation” enabled a “euphoric passage into a pluralistic dimension [in] 
all aspects of Ukrainian life,” by “an openness to the West, an inser-
tion into world-wide processes of globalization through the mass 
media, music . . . , though the printed word, and the image.”175 As 
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the Iron Curtain lifted, Ukraine encountered the rest of the world 
stage. A feverish rush for new models ensued, to replace the vacuum 
left by Soviet implosion. Ukraine’s interest and experimentation with 
hitherto unfamiliar religious modalities generated a pluralism 
Ukraine had never known. 
2. Pluralism’s prospects 
Despite modest setbacks, such as the 1993 Amendments, several 
factors justify optimism that pluralism will remain an ideological 
force sufficient to secure significant religious liberty in Ukraine. First, 
time is on pluralism’s side. Every passing year erodes Ukraine’s long 
isolation. As Ukraine increasingly integrates with the international 
community, Ukraine acquires better reasons to uphold international 
norms of religious liberty. Internally, the growth of MRMs in 
Ukraine continues to outpace the dominant ones.176 This momen-
tum improves their institutional grounding, political clout, and social 
integration. Their contributions to society gain increasing recogni-
tion. Having shown itself unequal to the task, the government in-
creasingly calls upon these churches to soften the social burdens of 
the post-Soviet transition.177 
Second, peace favors pluralism. Ukraine has successfully kept its 
commitment to peace, despite woeful predictions of ethnic and na-
tionalist violence. The well-publicized “conflicts” among Ukrainian 
churches have rarely escalated beyond a war of words. Since inde-
pendence, there have been no documented killings, no burning of 
churches, no hostages or terrorism, and no armed conflict.178 This 
tranquility seems remarkable, considering “the dislocation, the 
trauma of many decades of violence, and the passion of confessional 
declarations.”179 When civil and religious strife erupted in bloodshed 
in Armenia, Georgia, Chechnya, and the Balkans, some thought this 
a universal and inevitable consequence of Communism’s collapse. 
But a decade later, all remains quiet on the Ukrainian front. The 
country appears immune from the agitation that has exploded along 
ethnic, economic, and religious fault lines and Ukraine presently 
“remains one of the most peaceful, tolerant societies in the post-
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Soviet world.”180 The public’s greatest political weakness—passivity 
and patience—may prove to be its greatest social strength. 
Third, Ukraine depends heavily on support from the West.181 
This aid is often explicitly (and always implicitly) contingent upon 
Ukraine’s respect for human rights. Ukraine’s position remains stra-
tegic and its economy defunct, so this preconditioned dependency is 
likely to continue. As long as Ukraine aspires to good relations with 
NATO and the European Union, it cannot safely disregard its inter-
national human rights commitments.182 Though some government 
circles sympathize with the xenophobic attitudes of traditional 
churches, “the operative consensus appears to be that the state 
would be hard put to prohibit or abolish any of the . . . registered 
denominations without compromising its commitment to democra-
tization before the world.”183 However, local bureaucrats feel less 
constrained than national leaders by international commitments. 
This disconnect between “the two levels in the decision-making 
process toward the problems of the Church-state relations” frustrates 
local compliance with nationally endorsed international standards.184 
This dichotomy may pose the greatest practical obstacle to religious 
liberty. 
Fourth, another force from abroad exerts a positive influence on 
religious pluralism: dislocated Ukrainians. The government is con-
cerned with the rights of the over five million Ukrainians living in 
the “inner diaspora” (Russia and other formerly Soviet republics).185 
A policy of reciprocity between republics will likely govern issues of 
cultural autonomy and religious freedom. Understanding this, 
Ukrainians in Russia “have become some of the most avid supporters 
of a culturally and ethnically pluralized Ukraine.”186 
Fifth, the dominant churches seem utterly unable to forge any al-
liance that could focus opposition against MRMs. Ukraine’s com-
petitive pluralism must be distinguished from the cooperative ecu-
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menism the West has enjoyed since the Vatican II Council.187 
Ukraine’s churches are “busy in establishing their own identity, 
status, and image.”188 Particularly among traditional churches, 
“much resentment and many counterclaims” and “no previous ecu-
menical experience and basic education” militates against coopera-
tion.189 Though it lacks the spirit of tolerance often associated with 
pluralism, this discord favors pluralism by keeping the marketplace 
open. 
VI. ARENAS OF COMPETITION AMONG CHURCHES AND STATE IN 
UKRAINE 
A. The Real Property of Churches 
The freedom to exercise religion publicly created a surge in de-
mand for religious real estate. As glasnost permitted old antagonisms 
to revive, religious tensions were “most acutely defined” by the legal 
and political question of who owned what.190 The dimensions of the 
problem are significant, and their complexity defies speedy resolu-
tion. The arena of church property development entails three princi-
pal issues: (1) how to re-open buildings formerly closed by the state, 
(2) where to construct new buildings and with what funds, and (3) 
how to determine which church has legal title to lease (not own) re-
ligious buildings.191 This last issue—the determination of title—has 
proven most controversial.192 
Shortly after the Soviets came to power, the state seized church 
property and leased portions of it back to churches on harsh terms.193 
Many church buildings were converted to museums or warehouses. 
In the 1980s, churches demanded that religious property be re-
turned to churches for religious uses. New congregations could re-
quest permission to use these buildings after refurbishment. Today, 
as the universal lessor, the state enjoys significant control and “a 
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largely uncontested role” in the disputes between churches.194 While 
President Kuchma views actual ownership of land by religious or-
ganizations as “quite realistic in the future,” the present reality is that 
those religious organizations fortunate enough to “have” property 
are still merely lease-holding tenants of the state.195 
Resolving the competing claims among churches upon the re-
turned property has proven extraordinarily complex, given the vicissi-
tudes of Ukrainian history. It approximates adjudicating land use 
rights in Old Jerusalem. For example, a typical building in western 
Ukraine was owned seriatim by the Uniates, then the UAOC, and 
then the ROC. Determining the “rightful owner” depends on how 
far one turns back the clock. Under Soviet law, the ROC held an ex-
clusive lease to any church property; it could be rescinded only by 
the church’s consent, by a popular vote with the church’s consent, or 
by its illegal use of the property—all unlikely scenarios.196 
In many cases, officials have put the controversy to a popular 
vote. These referenda have led to peaceable transfers in areas where 
allegiance to one church is predominant.197 But problems remain. 
How should close votes be resolved? Should the preferences of a 
building’s current parishioners and clergy take precedence? How 
should the state compensate for the ROC’s (and its successor UOC-
MP’s) numerical advantage (a half-century of en masse forced conver-
sions) when distributing property among traditional churches? What 
of the counterclaims that the UOC-MP, as “faithful stewards of the 
churches entrusted to them by the state” deserves “special considera-
tion?”198 
Local governments have tried alternative approaches to avoid a 
referendum or to soften its results. Some oblasts have arranged “joint 
use” timetables, by which different church congregations take turns 
in the same building.199 Other oblasts have provided land to enable 
the minority or “losing” religious community to build an alternative 
structure, triggering a construction boom of thousands of (mostly 
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small) church buildings.200 But this solution is not entirely satisfac-
tory either. Real property is not fungible; certain holy structures and 
sites, which represent as much as a millennium of sacred heritage, are 
entirely unique. 
Unfortunately, despite the procedure and considerations spelled 
out in the Law on FCRO, “[o]ften the solution is imposed arbitrar-
ily, depending on the pressure from below and above.”201 The bu-
reaucracy’s passive obstructionism can stonewall a church. For exam-
ple, Kiev city officials have not approved the Uniate Church’s 
prolonged petitions for even a single church building for its 30,000 
members in Kiev.202 This arbitrariness exacerbates long-standing 
popular conflicts, which occasionally erupt in vocal protests. By 
2000, the number of property-related “trouble spots” nationwide 
had been reduced from about 500, but 300 remain.203 
B. Legal Registration of Religious Organizations 
A second legal issue at the forefront of Ukraine’s church-state re-
lations is the process of obtaining and maintaining legal registration 
for a religious organization. Registration is nominally optional but 
effectively a requirement. Unregistered organizations are without le-
gal standing and thus cannot, for example, invite foreign missionar-
ies, buy or rent property, or publish literature. For religious organi-
zations interested in registering, the official procedures for achieving 
legal status are set forth plainly in the Law on FCRO.204 But registra-
tion is not so straightforward in practice. Extra-legal procedures, 
unwarranted delays, and bureaucratic whims beset the applicant. 
Because registration is granted at the oblast level, a religious or-
ganization registered in one oblast must repeat the entire process 
when it wishes to commence activity in a second oblast.205 No incen-
tive prompts local governments to honor the one- to three-month 
timeframe for registration.206 The government officials can delay the 
process, insist on extra conditions, or stall for bribes. The religious 
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organization has little practical leverage to counter these extra-legal 
acts. Though the Law on FCRO creates a private right of action 
against delayed registrations, the perceived impudence of insisting on 
those rights in court can be politically disastrous, even if legally suc-
cessful.207 
Even if a religious organization does achieve registration, it re-
mains at the mercy of the government’s goodwill to effectuate many 
of its activities, e.g., renting a meeting facility, inviting foreign mis-
sionaries, importing religious literature, avoiding harassment by po-
lice or tax auditors, and buying or constructing a building for wor-
ship. This is no accident. The procedures require government 
approval and oversight of a religious organization’s even routine ac-
tivities.208 Thus the government has arbitrary power to apply pressure 
against religious organizations at multiple chokepoints. 
An ominous episode regarding the UOAC in the early 1990s 
demonstrates the state’s willingness to abruptly cancel valid registra-
tions for political reasons. In the national government’s attempt to 
forcibly merge the UOAC into a new national church (the UOC-
KP), the government revoked the valid legal registration of the 
UOAC.209 Most congregations of the UOAC refused to merge, and 
thus have been without legal identity ever since.210 The impact of bu-
reaucratic obstructionism varies by degree. Though some registration 
applications have long languished in limbo, oblast governments have 
affirmatively denied registration to very few religious organiza-
tions.211 The registration process could be much worse, and in Rus-
sia, it is.212 Unlike Russia, Ukraine has thus far resisted changes in the 
statute that would increase the registration requirements, demand re-
registration, or openly discriminate against non-traditional churches. 
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C. Foreign Missionaries 
While property disputes emotionally polarize the dominant 
churches, the question of foreign missionaries (a.k.a. religious work-
ers or clergy) provokes the most tension between the dominant and 
non-dominant churches. The primary issue is whether and how to 
issue visas to foreign missionaries. A secondary issue regards their 
freedom of movement within Ukraine once they arrive. 
1. Entering the doors of the nation 
Both sides of the debate—both for and against missionary en-
try—consider the issue vital to their survival. MRMs rely heavily on 
their headquarters abroad for financial and personnel support. It was 
foreign missionaries who introduced and provided initial leadership 
for nearly all MRMs.213 After this foothold stage, foreign missionaries 
circulate as the lifeblood of these fledgling religious organizations. 
They establish congregations and programs and then ease the transi-
tion to local leadership. By continuing to increase membership, they 
cultivate broader roots for the religious organization in Ukraine. 
Dominant churches could respond to this dynamism by adapta-
tion or interdiction. So far, they have chosen the latter strategy and 
have hounded the government to restrict foreigners access into and 
around Ukraine. They resent the foreign missionaries for their effec-
tiveness. Typically well financed, well organized, and highly moti-
vated, foreign missionaries have won many followers in a short time. 
Since independence, the Orthodox Church has lost both its seventy-
year monopoly and most of its state funding. This has rendered it 
sluggish, weak, and inexperienced in proselytism, and thus unable to 
compete with foreign proselytizing methods. Under the former So-
viet Law on Religious Associations, religious groups were forbidden 
from engaging in social outreach and confined to the performance of 
rituals.214 Until independence, priests “tended tiny flocks of die-hard 
faithful who . . . [braved] harassment and persecution.”215 Today, 
this same Orthodox clergy is “called to develop overnight the skills 
required to foster the spiritual, infrastructural, fiscal, social, and intel-
lectual life of their communities which passed suddenly from a mo-
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dality of survival to a dynamic of exponential growth.”216 Over-
whelmed by the experience of mature foreign missionary programs in 
these matters, dominant churches call for closing the border, rather 
than engaging the society in similar forms of outreach. 
The interdiction strategy of dominant churches yielded tempo-
rary results. The 1993 Amendments responded to this pressure. The 
granting and renewal of visas for foreign missionaries dropped dra-
matically the following year; yet today, missionaries once again re-
ceive visas routinely.217 Dominant churches may find that an adapta-
tion strategy is essential to survival. Because Ukraine’s renaissance 
has created “the most pluralistic and competitive denominational re-
ligious market in all of Eastern Europe,”218 one view is that domi-
nant churches “will have to accept the modern principle of religious 
freedom and voluntaristic affiliation and adopt the evangelical pas-
toral attitude required to survive in a free religious market.”219 
A different view holds that the pressure to interdict or adapt is 
exaggerated because dominant churches and MRMs do not compete 
directly for membership. Rather, the MRMs and dominant churches 
occupy different parts of the playing field. The foreign missionaries 
of MRMs fill the void of religious needs unmet by the dominant 
churches. They reach out in new ways and new places to the “mil-
lions of unchurched religious believers in Ukraine.”220 MRMs 
“swelled from the ranks of former non-believers,” the religiously in-
experienced, and those who had not strongly affiliated with domi-
nant churches.221 Foreign missionaries offer a religious “product” 
different from dominant churches. MRMs typically foster a practical, 
community-oriented form of religious life, in contrast to the cere-
monial, ritual-oriented religion offered by dominant churches. For-
eign missionaries do create religious alternatives, but sociological  
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evidence suggests that the satisfied members of dominant churches 
remain there.222 
Dominant churches primarily object neither to the manner of 
proselytizing nor the novelty of MRMs. Rather, the mere fact of 
“outright proselytizing . . . offends Orthodox leaders and violates the 
spirit of ecumenism.”223 For example, Roman Catholic priests prose-
lytizing in eastern Ukraine encounter opposition; the Uniate Church 
perceives them as a threat to its cherished role as the exclusive 
“bearer of Catholicism” to the Orthodox world.224 This opposition is 
vociferously impressed upon the government. Without naming 
names, President Kuchma in 1996 expressed concern about the 
spread of “aggressive totalitarian cults,” grouping them together 
with “active foreign missionary organizations,” as exerting “a de-
structive influence on our population.”225 
2. Mobility within Ukraine 
Another tool to restrict foreign missionaries who do receive visas 
and enter Ukraine is to interpret article 24 of the Law on FCRO nar-
rowly to severely proscribe their mobility.226 This interpretation con-
fines foreign missionaries to the territory of the religious organiza-
tion that invited him or her. The law says nothing about how these 
territorial boundaries of a religious organization should be deter-
mined. Opponents of MRM missionaries argue that the territory of a 
religious organization cannot extend beyond the territory of the 
oblast (i.e., the jurisdiction of the oblast government that approved 
the foreign missionaries’ invitation). 
If enforced, this interpretation would seriously disadvantage all 
churches without a presence in each of the twenty-five oblasts. In ef-
fect, it would impose a moratorium on the expansion of churches 
that do not already exist nationwide. MRM congregations do not 
spontaneously bloom and register in new oblasts. In practice, they 
bloom from seeds planted by foreign missionaries, who arrive in a 
new oblast, attract a congregation of at least ten members, and then 
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petition for legal status. A restrictive interpretation of article 24 
would prevent this initial entry into the oblast, requiring instead that 
the foreign missionaries receive an invitation from a congregation 
that does not yet exist. 
To date, inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of article 
24 points to no clear government policy.227 Only the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine can definitively determine whether this interpreta-
tion is permissible, but the aforementioned indelicacy of litigation 
makes this unlikely in the near future. Even when no interference is 
intended by the state, official attitudes reveal a “‘profound theoreti-
cal ignorance’ of Church life, and a ‘lack of sensitivity to the dynam-
ics of Church life, religious life, [and] even individual spirituality in 
implementing policy.’”228 The importance of missionary mobility 
within Ukraine is one visible example of this phenomenon. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ukraine faces enormous challenges at present: economic depres-
sion, political paralysis, and endemic corruption. In matters of reli-
gious liberty, however, Ukraine has reached a crossroads and seems 
headed in a promising direction. A decade of new openness has cata-
lyzed an unprecedented religious renaissance. Unlike many post-
Soviet reforms imposed from the top down, this renaissance has 
broad support from a citizenry that trusts the church and believes in 
religion as a regenerative social force. A country long dominated first 
by Orthodox and Uniate Christianity and then by Soviet atheism, 
Ukraine has now absorbed a range of religious perspectives. It has 
rejected both an attempt to establish a state-manipulated church and 
an effort to mimic Russia’s recent menacing measures toward so-
called “new religions.” 
Rather than restore the dominant churches as ethnoreligious 
monoliths or as tools of government control, the renaissance has 
transformed religion into a diverse and partially autonomous force in 
society. Nascent social initiatives by churches suggest the beginnings 
of an independent layer of civil society. Though numerically small, 
MRMs have led this trend through charity assistance, family support, 
education, and publication of religious literature. The religious mar-
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ketplace of missionaries and tracts has splintered the oligarchy of tra-
ditional churches. 
Legal protections for religious exercise and institutions have been 
secured by Parliaments, legislation and treaties, and Ukraine’s new 
Constitution.229 The Constitution contains guarantees against dis-
crimination and for freedom of movement, association, and con-
science. It makes explicit the right of individuals and organizations to 
worship and engage in religious activities, subject to considerations 
of public order, health, morality, and the rights of other persons. 
Church and state are to remain separate. The organic Law on the 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations enumerates ba-
sic rights for individuals and institutions. Individuals are free to pro-
fess, accept, and change their convictions. A religious organization 
can seek legal registration with the state, which entitles it to lease 
buildings and land and to invite foreign missionaries. Amendments 
in 1993 curtailed the statute’s liberality by restricting foreign mis-
sionaries and expanded the grounds for terminating a religious or-
ganization’s activities. 
The implementation of these constitutional and statutory rights, 
however, will remain contingent upon the outcome of the ideologi-
cal struggle underway among totalitarianism, nationalism, and plural-
ism. Ukraine’s Soviet political cadres, with their views and instincts, 
remained largely intact. Against these totalitarian methods and bu-
reaucratic obstructionism stand the rule of law, civil society, and citi-
zen initiative, but these are still infant institutions. The dominant, 
traditional churches fear their revival threatened by the more vibrant 
foreign churches, and thus have adopted a territorial, nationalistic 
spirit in calling for restrictions against their foreign rivals. But in its 
religious policy, the Ukrainian government has not yet yielded to na-
tionalist passions, despite their significance in each of Ukraine’s peri-
ods of independence. The government’s one attempt at establishing 
a state church boomeranged, and separation has increasingly charac-
terized church-state relations since. Despite its historically thin roots, 
some form of pluralism will likely prevail in Ukraine. Its citizenry has 
proved consistently committed to diversity and tolerance. The mo-
mentum generated by a decade of Ukraine’s peaceful transition and  
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its dependence on Western support and Russian goodwill validate a 
policy of pluralism. 
Ukraine’s commitment to these legal guarantees of liberty, which 
promote pluralism at the expense of totalitarianism and nationalism, 
are being tested in three primary legal disputes: religious property, 
legal registrations, and foreign missionary visas.230 The dominant 
churches disagree sharply about which institution holds legal title to 
the more prominent buildings and lands. However, the state has set-
tled many contested sites through local referenda, joint-use timeta-
bles, and the construction of new buildings of worship for outvoted 
or expanding religious groups. Despite the statute’s straightforward 
procedures for legal registration, discretionary additional procedures 
and bureaucratic caprice enable the government to keep religious or-
ganizations in constant suspense, without legal repose. The effec-
tiveness of foreign missionaries has mobilized traditional churches to 
urge the government to restrain their entry and mobility around 
Ukraine, rather than engage in similar forms of social outreach. 
On the whole, however, these three primary legal issues indicate 
favorable winds. Property disputes are in decline, missionaries regu-
larly gain entry, and the overwhelming majority of new congrega-
tions successfully register every year. Ukraine concludes its first dec-
ade of independence with significant religious freedom and pluralism 
intact. Its religious renaissance, symbolized by icons and missionary 
tracts, has propelled legal and social transformations that warrant 
guarded optimism for religious liberty in Ukraine. 








 230. See discussion supra Part VI. 
 ∗ This Comment is dedicated to the many believers of Ukraine who kept alive the 
flame of faith and freedom against the harshest persecutions of a Soviet regime that would tol-
erate no other gods before it. I thank Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr., for his scholarship, men-
toring, and devoted advocacy of religious liberty for all peoples. I am grateful to Professor 
Wilfried M. Voge, Professor Lyudmila Filipovich, and especially to my wife and classmate 
Hannah Clayson Smith for their insightful comments and faithful support. 
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